Compliance within authoritarian systems is secured not solely through coercive apparatuses but also through the calculated construction and amplification of perceived external threats. In such regimes, this mechanism acquires heightened salience, as external conflict is systematically instrumentalised as a modality of domestic governance. Recent developments in Iran, most notably the domestic crisis of 2026, in conjunction with intensifying regional tensions, constitute a salient contemporary manifestation of this dynamic.
Authoritarian regimes are structurally constrained by an inherent deficit of democratic legitimacy, given the absence of free, competitive, and institutionalised electoral processes. Consequently, they must rely on alternative sources of legitimation, including nationalist narratives, ideological framing, performance-based claims, and coercive capacity. Within this broader repertoire, external conflict, whether direct or mediated, emerges as a particularly potent political instrument. By discursively amplifying the salience of foreign threats, regimes activate a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, facilitating short-term social cohesion while simultaneously marginalising dissent and reconstituting political loyalty around the incumbent leadership during periods of acute crisis.
Beyond mere distraction, conflict is systematically deployed as an instrument of nationalist propaganda. In Iran, state-controlled media consistently frame geopolitical tensions as a defence of national sovereignty and religious identity. Under Ali Khamenei, narratives of “resistance” against Western powers and Israel function not only as foreign policy positions but as mechanisms of domestic mobilisation. Military actions and regional engagements are portrayed as heroic defences, reinforcing collective pride and loyalty.
This pattern is not unique. In Russia, Vladimir Putin has used the invasion of Ukraine to intensify nationalist sentiment and portray the state as a defender of Russian identity against external threats. Similarly, in North Korea, recurring military tensions are framed as essential to safeguarding sovereignty, reinforcing regime cohesion despite economic hardship.
Crucially, conflict can also serve as a mechanism for restoring regime popularity during moments of domestic vulnerability. In Iran, the 2026 crisis, marked by protests, economic strain, and political polarisation, brought the regime to the brink of a legitimacy breakdown. At certain points, widespread dissatisfaction suggested the possibility of systemic destabilisation. However, escalating regional confrontation allowed the leadership to reframe the political narrative. Rather than being seen as the source of domestic grievances, the regime repositioned itself as the defender of the nation.
This strategic shift generated a partial recovery in regime support, particularly among constituencies responsive to nationalist appeals. The rally effect, even if temporary, fragmented opposition and reduced protest momentum. In this sense, war functions not only as a diversion but also as a tool of political rehabilitation, enabling rulers to regain a degree of legitimacy when it is most threatened. Historical examples reinforce this dynamic. In Argentina, the military junta under Leopoldo Galtieri initiated the Falklands War to redirect attention from economic crisis and public unrest. While the war initially boosted nationalist support, the defeat ultimately accelerated the regime’s collapse, highlighting the risks inherent in this strategy.
Similarly, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein used the Iran–Iraq War to consolidate domestic authority by framing it as a defence of national survival. Although effective in the short term, prolonged conflict weakened the state economically and politically.
Not all regimes rely on full-scale war. In China, Xi Jinping has leveraged tensions in the South China Sea to sustain nationalist sentiment without incurring the risks of direct conflict. This “controlled confrontation” demonstrates how even limited external tensions can serve domestic political purposes.
At the same time, conflict provides justification for expanding repression. Under the banner of national security, regimes can intensify crackdowns, restrict media freedoms, and expand surveillance. In Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has assumed an increasingly central role in both external operations and internal control, illustrating how conflict reshapes domestic power structures.
Iran’s strategy also relies heavily on indirect engagement through proxy networks such as Hezbollah and Houthis. These relationships allow the regime to project influence while avoiding the full costs of conventional warfare. However, recent escalations suggest that the boundary between indirect and direct confrontation is becoming increasingly blurred.
Although a significant portion of the population remains opposed to the regime, many continue to strongly identify with their Iranian national identity. A large segment of modern, democratically inclined, and Western-educated individuals remains critical of the Iranian government and the supreme leader’s leadership. However, despite their opposition to the regime, they maintain a strong attachment to Iranian nationalism and the idea of national unity. This reflects a “son of the soil” orientation, in which territorial identity and national belonging remain deeply rooted even among politically dissident groups. As a result, the events surrounding the 2026 conflict have not necessarily transformed regime opponents into supporters, but have, in many cases, shifted them toward a more neutral position. This is largely because external confrontation reinforces concerns about national fragmentation and external interference.
Despite its short-term utility, this strategy carries significant risks. As of April 2026, Iran remains highly volatile. Inflation is nearing 40 percent, the currency has collapsed, and rising living costs are fueling widespread public frustration. While large-scale protests have been contained through a forceful security crackdown, underlying grievances persist. Intermittent strikes in commercial hubs, particularly the Grand Bazaar, further reflect ongoing economic strain. The April 8 ceasefire has offered only temporary relief. If negotiations fail and military confrontation resumes, internal pressures could rapidly escalate into renewed protests or broader political instability.
Ultimately, authoritarian regimes do not merely react to external threats; they often instrumentalise conflict as a deliberate strategy for internal control. War can generate unity, restore popularity, and justify repression, but these effects are often short-lived. As contemporary and historical cases illustrate, when domestic grievances reach a critical threshold, even the most carefully managed conflicts may fail to prevent political instability or regime decline.
Md Al-Amin is an Associate Professor at the University of Barishal, Bangladesh.