Michael Kugelman is the Director of the South Asia Institute at Washington, D.C.-based think tank, the Wilson Center. He is one of the leading analysts on South Asian geopolitics, U.S. policy, and regional security. Kugelman has long been closely observing Bangladesh’s politics and policymaking processes. Recently, he spoke with Bonik Barta about Bangladesh’s position in the current regional geopolitical landscape and the impact of South Asia’s shifting geopolitics. The interview was conducted by Mahafuz Rahaman.

Recently, South Asia’s geopolitical landscape has been changing rapidly. In this new geopolitical reality, where exactly does Bangladesh stand?

In recent times, several major geopolitical shifts have taken place in South Asia, many of which directly involve Bangladesh. At one time, one of the region’s strongest bilateral relationships was between Bangladesh and India. That relationship is now going through a period of strain. On the other hand, Bangladesh–Pakistan relations, which had remained stagnant for many years, have suddenly begun to grow closer. These changes in two major bilateral relationships involving Bangladesh are undoubtedly of great significance.

Primarily due to its geographic location, Bangladesh’s strategic importance is enduring. In addition, the country maintains multifaceted relationships with India, Pakistan, Russia, and China—ties that further reinforce this geopolitical significance.

You have been following Bangladesh politics and policies for many years. How do you assess the activities of the Interim Government led by Dr. Mohammad Yunus? And where do you think Bangladesh is heading?

When the Interim Government took office more than a year ago, it was saddled with very high expectations from the public. And the Interim Government itself set very ambitious goals, in terms of passing far-ranging reforms and vowing to stabilize the economy, bringing back democracy, and so on. And so if you look at the balance sheet now, I think that some significant levels of progress have been made, particularly on the reforms front.

But I think in other areas there are significant shortages, particularly when it comes to the economy, which of course continues to be fragile. The law and order situation is troubling. And there’s still a lack of clarity as to what exactly has happened with the reforms process.

And what I sense now on this trip and on my previous trip in January is a level of growing impatience on the part of the public directed at the Interim Government, looking for results that aren’t there, wanting to get more clarity about various things.

And so I think in that sense, the upcoming election takes on great significance. There’s a lot of stakes associated with it because it seems to me that much of the public wants there to be a free, fair, legitimate, on-time election in which you then have a government that is representing the mandate of the people and is ready to take on the tasks that the Interim Government have been taking, particularly tackling the economic challenges, the law and order situation, looking to continue with the reforms process and also ensuring that Bangladesh’s important foreign relationships continue to be strong.

In your opinion, what challenges will Bangladesh face in the coming days?

I think there are challenges on all fronts. Starting locally—as I mentioned earlier, the economy is still a major problem. The immediate challenge is to stabilize the macroeconomy and reduce inflation. In the long term, the challenge is to build an economy that is sustainable. For this, Bangladesh needs to diversify its export products—because for many years there has been excessive dependence on ready-made garments. In my view, increasing foreign direct investment is also an important long-term challenge for Bangladesh.

On the political side, there are also problems. The culture of retaliatory politics that has existed in Bangladesh for many years is still deeply entrenched. In addition, the Awami League has been excluded from the election (its activities have been banned), and along with other political factors, this could create a risk of violence.

You have spoken about the ban on the Awami League’s political activities. Recently, we have also seen calls to ban the Jatiya Party. What is your opinion on this?

To put it bluntly, I don’t think banning political parties is a good idea. I can understand the reasoning behind banning the Awami League. When we listen to Hasina’s speech from India, there is no remorse—no apology for past atrocities. But the problem is, when you ban an entire party, the first risk that arises is what I mentioned earlier: the culture of retaliatory politics will remain even more deeply entrenched. You know, political polarization exists in many countries. But when it becomes retaliatory and violent, that’s when it becomes the most concerning. And if you want to bring back a strong and well-functioning democracy, then this matter needs to be handled with caution.

What is your opinion regarding the political future of the Awami League?

Well, I think that there’s no future for her in the immediate term. But, you know, one thing that one notices about political dynasties in South Asia is that you can never count them out, right? They don’t, they never really go away. And if you look at India, for example, you know, a dynastic party has been in the opposition for a very long time. Same with Pakistan, where you have several different dynastic parties that are very much in the mix. You know, depending on Hasina’s health, depending on what happens in Bangladesh politically over the next five, ten years, you never know if a comeback may be made. But honestly, in the immediate term future, I cannot imagine any scenario under which you could make a comeback. No matter who wins the election, they will not welcome her back. That’s not going to happen.

There is talk of a possible shift in U.S. policy toward Myanmar. Trump is trying to gain control over Myanmar’s rare earth minerals. Will this add a new dimension to South Asian geopolitics?

This is very significant and it has great implications for Bangladesh, for the border crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the Rohingya crisis. This is a great example of how we just can’t predict Trump. He’s been sending signals that he wants to cooperate more with China and maybe reach some sort of understanding with China. But at the same time, he’s taking these very bold steps in Myanmar, which completely go against U.S. policy in recent years, all in an effort to counter China.

Trump is easing sanctions on some of the Generals in Myanmar to make it easier for the U.S. to engage with Myanmar to access rare earths in Myanmar, which Trump wants to keep China from getting to. It’s going to be very difficult for the U.S. to do this. I mean, it seems to be very interested in rare earths and critical minerals in countries that are very dangerous and unstable. But that seems to be what he wants to do, and indeed it is significant for Bangladesh too.

Do you think Rohingya repatriation is possible in the near future?

This is one of the world’s great tragedies. One of the world’s greatest and most overlooked tragedies. It’s so disheartening that, quite frankly, very few people in the world know about the Rohingya crisis. And the international aid community is aware of it for sure. I think that given what’s happening in Myanmar now, given that neither the Arakan army nor the Myanmar state, the government, civilian folks, military folks, none of them can be trusted to protect the Rohingya. So I understand that Bangladesh’s official position is to promote the safe, peaceful voluntary return of Rohingya refugees but it seems like now is just not the time when that can happen and I can’t speak for the next government here but I don’t think the Interim Government seriously expects to quickly repatriate all of these refugees at a moment when you have significant levels of instability in Myanmar.

So does that mean there is no possibility of Rohingya repatriation for now?

I think in the long term or even in the mid-term there could be some progress made. I mean this does not have to be an intractable conflict. The most intractable conflicts and disputes are those that involve territory, that involve religious differences, that type of thing. This is simply a conflict, right? I mean it’s a humanitarian crisis, it’s a conflict between a range of actors. It’s very complicated as well. The matter is indeed very complex, but it would not be accurate to say that it will remain unresolved forever.

Do you think that if U.S. policy toward Myanmar changes, this problem will become even more complicated?

Well, it depends what President Trump wants to do. I mean the military junta these days doesn’t face all that much pressure because it’s got backers in Russia and China and some other places. India also continues to have ties with the junta. And if the U.S. is going to start easing sanctions and wanting to work with the junta, I think that would reduce pressure. It’s unclear to me where else the pressure could come from, maybe the EU, maybe Europe.

Bangladesh doesn’t really have the leverage to apply pressure and I don’t think Bangladesh would want to apply pressure. It wants to maintain this very delicate balance between maintaining that relationship with the Myanmar state and also engaging in this dialogue with the Arakan army.

Are you saying that Bangladesh should increase its engagement with the Arakan Army?

Absolutely. I think Bangladesh has no alternative here. My sense is that Bangladeshi officials think the same way. The Arakan Army currently controls almost the entire border—there is no way to ignore them. And if there is ever to be work on the possibility of Rohingya repatriation in the future, then Bangladesh will certainly have to work with the Arakan Army. This is an unavoidable reality.

South Asian geopolitics is changing rapidly. Recently, Trump’s trade tariffs have dealt a major blow to India. Do you think there will be significant changes in India–China bilateral relations?

Yeah, major changes on the U.S.-India-China front. The U.S.-India crisis is real. Those that support the partnership need to be very worried about it. The U.S. has lost so much of its trust in India and so many different aspects of the relationship that have affected. People-to-people ties, trade ties, strategic ties. and the relationship between the two leaders, which has been very strong. Now, India-China is different. That’s a more complex relationship. We’ve seen efforts on the part of India and China over almost a year to ease tensions. And now, of course, Modi has gone to China for the first time in seven years.

But that is a relationship that continues to be limited by several key factors. One is the disputed border between the two. It’s a source of considerable distrust, as well as China’s alliance with Pakistan, which remains very strong. And in the last conflict between India and Pakistan, Pakistan used Chinese weapons for the first time against India.

So that suggests to me there’s going to be limits, and we should not be talking about some type of new realignment or something like that. The India-China relationship might improve. Both countries have good reasons for wanting to ease tensions, but it’s not going to become some type of new partnership.

So you are saying it is not possible for China to be friends with both India and Pakistan at the same time?

It can’t just be. Because of the China-Pakistan alliance, it can have a workable relationship with India. But for the reasons I said, China cannot always pick Pakistan over India. Pakistan of course, provides China access to deep water ports in the Arabian Sea. So there’s that strategic importance for Pakistan. And China knows that Pakistan’s relationship with India is not going to change anytime soon. And it’s helpful for China to have a country like Pakistan, which can work with it to counter India. There may not be many cultural similarities between China and Pakistan, but strategically, geopolitically, they’re very aligned. And that makes very clear to me that there’s only so much progress we can see in this India-China detente.

At the SCO summit, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi were seen together. What message does this actually convey?

It’s a very powerful image, a very powerful optic to have Modi flanked by both Putin and Xi, two leaders that are rivals of the United States. And of course, Putin being the leader that the U.S. wants India to distance itself from, and of course Xi being the leader of America’s top rival, all of this at a moment when U.S.-India relations are experiencing a severe crisis. I think that one could argue that all three men standing there wanted to send a message of defiance to the U.S. government.

You have spent almost a week in Bangladesh. How are you feeling? What is your overall impression of Bangladesh?

Well, I mean, every time I come here, I always gain a few pounds because I eat too much of the very good food here. It’s always great.

The most memorable moments were engaging with young people. This is a country where we had major achievements with youth activism and youth policy, given that young people led the uprising last year. So I feel it’s incumbent on me as an analyst of Bangladesh to engage with young people and listen to them. There were all kinds of different views that were expressed. I’ll take that into account as I go back to Washington.