India inaugurated the Farakka Barrage in April 1975. Despite being invited, Bangladesh decided not to send any delegation to the event. Abdur Rab Serniabat, then Bangladesh’s Minister of Water Resources, was scheduled to attend the event. However, a government decision kept him from participating, reflecting Bangladesh’s deep dissatisfaction with the barrage. India had activated the barrage before finalizing an agreement with Bangladesh, sparking significant unrest in the country. This led to Bangladesh’s decision to boycott the inauguration. Nearly 49 years have passed, yet the Farakka Barrage and the distribution of the Ganges River’s waters remain a contentious issue in Bangladesh-India relations.

The roots of dissatisfaction over the Farakka Barrage in this region date back nearly 75 years. As early as 1951, when India first planned to construct the barrage on the Ganges River, there was immediate discontent in what was then East Bengal. The Pakistani government formally objected, leading to several discussions between the two governments. However, no resolution was reached. Over the past five decades, the Farakka barrage has been a recurrent topic in the political landscape of both Bangladesh and India.

In Bangladesh, political parties have repeatedly promised to secure a fair share of water from the Farakka Barrage. However, dissatisfaction with the barrage persists. According to international relations analysts, the barrage significantly contributed to the rise of anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh post independence. Some even argue that the failure to secure adequate Ganges water was among the grievances that fueled opposition against Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, playing a role in the events leading to his assassination on August 15, 1975.

The current Ganges water-sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh is set to expire in 2026, and its renewal remains uncertain.

Rameez Mohammad Bhat, a researcher at Aligarh Muslim University, has studied water politics between India and Bangladesh. In his paper, Bhat notes that India’s premature activation of the Farakka Barrage created a negative perception of India in Bangladesh. This perception was particularly strong among Bangabandhu’s political opponents, who began to view India’s role in the liberation war with increased complexity. As a result, the implementation of the Bangladesh-India Friendship Treaty faced obstacles. Bangabandhu’s failure to secure Ganges water only intensified opposition against him, which contributed to the tragic events of August 15, 1975.

Commenting on the Bangladesh-India relationship, former Bangladeshi Ambassador Humayun Kabir told Bonik Barta, “The conflict over Farakka existed even before Bangladesh’s independence, but it became more pronounced later, fostering anti-India sentiments. Over the past few decades, India’s actions—ranging from border killings to its involvement in Bangladesh’s elections—have further deepened the public’s negative perception. India’s approach has often appeared self-serving, failing to foster a genuinely positive relationship with the people of Bangladesh.”

Immediately after Bangladesh’s independence, the country took steps to ensure the fair distribution of water from transboundary rivers. In 1972, the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was established with this objective in mind. Given the then-friendly relations between Bangladesh and India, there was widespread optimism that the two nations would soon reach an acceptable water-sharing agreement. However, these hopes were not realized. Despite the Indian National Congress party’s reputation for being sympathetic toward Bangladesh, its role in the Ganges water-sharing negotiations remained highly questionable.

Since independence, Bangladesh and India have signed a total of five short and long-term agreements regarding the distribution of the Ganges River water at the Farakka Barrage. The first roundtable discussion between the two countries concerning the Ganges took place in 1973. It was decided that the Farakka Barrage would only be operational after a final agreement on water distribution was reached. Despite several meetings between the two countries until 1975, differences on various issues prevented a solution. However, Bangladesh agreed to allow India to withdraw water on a trial basis for 40 days, from April 2 to May 31. According to this agreement, India would draw between 11,000 and 16,000 cusecs of water from the Ganges every 10 days, leaving 39,000 to 44,000 cusecs for Bangladesh. But before reaching a final agreement, India fully operationalized the barrage and continued to withdraw water from the Ganges even after the 40-day agreement expired, increasing the amount of water withdrawn.

Following the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 and the resulting political instability, no further discussions occurred at the government level. In May 1976, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani called for a long march towards Farakka to demand Bangladesh’s rightful share of water. This call sparked nationwide uproar, and at the age of 90, he led the march. This event revived the issue’s importance, leading to its inclusion in the agenda of the 31st United Nations session by then-President Ziaur Rahman. The United Nations recommended resolving the issue through bilateral negotiations. Relations between the two countries improved somewhat after the non-Congress government, led by Morarji Desai, came to power in India, and a five-year water-sharing agreement was signed in 1977. This agreement guaranteed Bangladesh at least 80 percent of its rightful share during the dry season, based on previous flow levels. However, the Congress party opposed this agreement. The party even stated that it would withdraw from such agreement once they regained power. Although Congress came to power in 1980, it did not act on this promise.

When the five-year agreement expired in 1982, Hussain Muhammad Ershad was in power in Bangladesh. He visited India that year and signed a two-year water-sharing agreement. However, this agreement did not guarantee Bangladesh’s share of the water. When the agreement expired in 1985, it was renewed for three years. Meanwhile, Bangladesh experienced a devastating flood in 1988, submerging nearly two-thirds of the country. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) held India’s Farakka Barrage and other dams responsible for the flood. After the BNP came to power in 1991, it sought to resolve the Farakka water sharing issue both bilaterally and internationally. However, no effective solution was reached, and the 1985 agreement expired. Even without a new agreement, India increased the amount of water it withdrew from the Ganges.

In 1996, after 21-year period, the Awami League formed the government for the second time. At that time, a new non-Congress and left-leaning government came to power in India. Discussions on the Ganges water-sharing resumed, and in December of the same year, a 25-year agreement was signed. According to this agreement, if the Ganges River’s flow during the dry season (January 1 to May 31) is 70,000 cusecs or less, the two countries will share the water equally. If the flow is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh will receive 35,000 cusecs, and the remainder will flow to India. If the flow exceeds 75,000 cusecs, India will receive 40,000 cusecs, and the remainder will flow to Bangladesh.

However, the 1996 agreement also had complexities. An analysis of the five agreements signed regarding the Ganges River shows that Bangladesh’s share of the water has gradually decreased. In other water-sharing agreements within the subcontinent, the total river flow is considered. Additionally, upstream countries provide downstream countries with data on all dams, barrages, and reservoirs constructed on the river. This approach was followed even in the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. However, these principles were overlooked in the Ganges Treaty. India only provides Bangladesh with data on the Farakka Barrage, despite having constructed several other barrages and dams upstream that disrupt the Ganges’ natural flow to Farakka.

Dr. Md. Nazrul Islam, a law professor at Dhaka University, has conducted extensive research on the Ganges Treaty. In his book on the subject, he notes that water-sharing agreements in the subcontinent typically emphasize equity and fairness. However, these principles were not adequately upheld in the Ganges Treaty, nor was environmental protection given the necessary attention.

Water expert M. Inamul Haque told Bonik Barta, “The Farakka Barrage agreement between Bangladesh and India was driven more by political considerations than by concern for the people. Even if we look at the 1996 treaty, it did not ensure Bangladesh’s rightful share. Although it was a long-term agreement, it was weaker than the treaties of 1975 or 1977. The amount of water allocated to Bangladesh dropped to 27,000 cusecs. This is causing the rivers in the Rangpur and Rajshahi regions to nearly dry up, leading to severe water shortages. Furthermore, we receive no information about the other barrages and dams that India has constructed upstream of the Ganges, apart from Farakka.”

The treaty stipulated that the flow of water into Bangladesh would be maintained based on the average flow from 1949 to 1988. However, comparing the flow in 2024 with that period reveals that the current flow has, in some cases, decreased by as much as one-third. As a result, most rivers in the Rangpur and Rajshahi regions have lost their navigability. This has led to severe water shortages during the dry season, negatively impacting agriculture and daily life. And reduced river depth season has increased the risk of flooding in vast areas during the monsoon.

The 30-year Ganges Treaty is set to expire in 2026. When discussions about renewing the treaty took place earlier this year between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee reacted with strong disapproval. Additionally, the recent change in government in Bangladesh has created uncertainty regarding the future of diplomatic relations between India and Bangladesh as well as the renewal of the Ganges Treaty. Nevertheless, water and legal experts believe that Bangladesh should maintain friendly relations with India while adhering to international law in these negotiations.

In his book, Dr. Asif Nazrul highlights several key points for the renewal of the Ganges Treaty. One of the most crucial is the inclusion of Nepal, as a country within the Ganges basin, to establish a water-sharing agreement among the three countries based on international law. He also emphasizes the importance of ensuring that Bangladesh, as a downstream country, receives all relevant upstream data. However, since Bangladesh has not signed the United Nations Watercourses Convention, there are some obstacles to obtaining legal protection under international law. Although Bangladesh voted in favor of the UN International Watercourses Convention, adopted by the UN General Assembly on May 21, 1997, it did not sign the treaty for unknown reasons.

Dr. Mohammad Abul Hossen, a member of Bangladesh’s Joint Rivers Commission, believes that signing the convention would benefit Bangladesh in securing water-sharing rights for transboundary rivers. He said, “Work is ongoing to renew the Ganges Treaty. Our main focus now is to organize a meeting between the ministers of both countries, where all crucial issues, including the treaty renewal, will be discussed. We are also trying to ensure that India provides us with information related to the dams in advance, such as water levels and when the gates are opened. However, moving forward on all these issues will require greater cooperation from India. Additionally, if Bangladesh signs the UN convention, resolving these issues will become easier.”