The Chinese-built Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in the conflict-ravaged Rakhine State of Myanmar has emerged as a new geopolitical focal point for South and Southeast Asia. The first explanation for the port’s importance comes from China’s long-standing strategic weakness. Ships traveling to the Middle East, Africa, or Europe from China’s eastern ports must navigate the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea — a route that is both slow and geopolitically risky. Control of the Malacca Strait falls under the combined influence of the United States, India, and several Southeast Asian nations.
Kyaukphyu provides China with an alternative path. With a direct line to the Bay of Bengal, the port connects via pipeline and highway to Yunnan Province, giving Beijing a “Malacca Strait bypass” strategy. This alternative allows China to circumvent the Malacca Strait, creating a faster, safer, and more efficient trade corridor. For this reason, Kyaukphyu has become one of the most strategically significant points in the Bay of Bengal.
Analysts describe the port as a core node for China’s energy security. Crude oil and gas from the Middle East can now reach Kyaukphyu directly and travel overland to Yunnan through pipelines, rather than taking the long maritime route through the Malacca Strait. The port can also provide logistical support for China’s naval operations, reinforcing its long-term presence in the Indian Ocean. Kyaukphyu is thus not merely a commercial port but is poised to play a role in China’s future military-logistic network.
Chattogram Port is relatively close to Kyaukphyu by sea —around 200 nautical miles, depending on the route. In other words, two regional ports sit along the same northeastern Bay of Bengal corridor: one, a strategic Chinese asset; the other, Bangladesh’s main commercial gateway. This geographical proximity has brought Kyaukphyu into focus in port-based geopolitics in the Bay of Bengal. Experts note that as China develops new trade corridors through Kyaukphyu, the Chittagong Port naturally emerges as the next potential port in the network.
On this matter, Major General (Retd.) ANM Muniruzzaman, president of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), told Bonik Barta, “Because of its geographic location, the Chittagong port is effectively the gateway to the Indian Ocean. It has become one of the Bay of Bengal’s most strategic points. Since the development of the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, geopolitical competition along this entire coastal region has intensified. Naturally, after Kyaukphyu, major powers will increasingly focus on Chittagong, because these two ports together determine control over much of the northeastern maritime routes and logistics in the Bay of Bengal. In the Indo-Pacific context, Chittagong’s strategic importance is now far higher.”
He added, “Whatever we do around the port, major powers will keep a close eye on it. It’s part of regional geopolitics surrounding the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.”
Chittagong is Bangladesh’s busiest port, handling roughly 90 percent of the country’s total imports and exports. However, by international standards, it is not a deep-sea port. Its navigable depth is limited, preventing large mother vessels from docking directly. Transshipment must be routed through deep-sea ports in Colombo or Singapore. As a result, Chittagong is unlikely to become a central hub in an international “hub and spoke” system in the near future. These limitations reduce investor interest in large-scale projects, though its geographic location ensures that its strategic importance remains high and continues to grow in various geopolitical contexts.
Security analyst Major (Retd.) Emdadul Islam told Bonik Barta, “It’s undeniable that port-based geopolitics is affecting Chittagong port for strategic reasons. And it is not just Chittagong; the Matarbari port is also part of the same strategic framework. When the Japanese undertook the Matarbari deep-sea port project, they clearly stated that the port would serve as a regional hub for India’s ‘Seven Sisters’ region, Myanmar, and neighboring countries. Following that announcement, China responded actively. They have already established a permanent naval base on Coco Island in Myanmar, which India has expressed concern over for a long time. China has also renewed its focus on western Myanmar — a plan it originally sought to execute at Sonadia, but due to strategic pressure, the project in Bangladesh didn’t move forward.”
He added that through the Kyaukphyu port and corridor, China has secured a comparatively shorter route into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. “In a sense, this also opens a new, advantageous window for reaching Africa and the Middle East. Considering these realities, it’s clear that the United States and other major powers will increasingly prioritize Chittagong and Matarbari ports strategically.”
A significant portion of China’s presence in the Bay of Bengal is anchored on two strategic ports: Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota. Kyaukphyu is more critical for China as it provides a rapid and secure route for energy and trade that bypasses the Malacca Strait. Hambantota, under Chinese control on a 99-year lease, offers a permanent logistical foothold in the Indian Ocean. Analysts note that China’s port investments across the Indian Ocean form part of a broader maritime strategy stretching from Africa’s Horn through South Asia to Southeast Asia. Beyond Hambantota and Kyaukphyu, Chinese infrastructure and commercial operations are present at Gwadar, Djibouti, Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, Lamu, Karachi, and Malacca. Besides providing commercial advantages, this network also enables long-term logistical and geopolitical influence across the Indian Ocean. In total, China has established a continuous maritime network linking more than 15 ports across Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, which analysts describe as “String of Pearls 2.0.”
In contrast, India’s presence in the Indian Ocean is comparatively limited. Its logistical or development network includes at least four ports: Chabahar, Sittwe, Dubai, and Duqm. The most discussed is Iran’s Chabahar port, where India has formal rights over operations, development, and management and effectively controls an alternative corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Myanmar’s Sittwe port was constructed by India as part of the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project, serving as a strategic entry point to the Arakan coast. India depends heavily on Dubai’s Jebel Ali port for its export, import, and transshipment flows, while in Oman’s Duqm port, it has secured long-term military and logistical access, facilitating naval movement from the Arabian Sea via deep-sea routes. Japan also operates four major port projects in the Indian Ocean region. The United States does not manage ports directly but maintains influence through strategic naval bases in Diego Garcia, Djibouti, and Bahrain, while France holds three military points across Réunion and Mayotte. Overall, China is the only country with a port-centric, regionally extensive network throughout the Indian Ocean.
China’s port network has cast such a shadow over the Indian Ocean that other powers are compelled to formulate counter-strategies. The most organized expression of this counter-strategy is the Quad, a security and strategic alliance between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. Its goal is not to directly challenge China’s port dominance militarily but to establish alternative capabilities in trade, infrastructure, supply chains, and transparency.
The Quad’s strategy in the Indian and Bay of Bengal oceans is now clear. First, they are reconstructing port development as part of a security framework. Unlike China, however, they are not pursuing a leasing strategy. Instead, they are assisting partner countries in building high-quality deep-sea ports, transshipment hubs, rail-to-sea connectivity, and modern logistics infrastructure. Projects such as India’s Kaladan initiative and Australia’s maritime security fund reflect this approach.
Second, the Quad countries are now running a “Supply Chain Resilience Initiative” to ensure that no country in the Indian Ocean becomes overly dependent on China. They are promoting transparency and quality investment across ports, fiber-optic cables, internet gateways, and energy infrastructure. The goal is to create a secure alternative network to reduce reliance on Chinese loans and dual-use facilities.
Third, the Quad is placing significant emphasis on maritime security. They are helping smaller Indo-Pacific coastal nations with satellite data, vessel tracking, maritime monitoring, and preventing illegal fishing. This oversight also limits the influence of Chinese research vessels or other unknown maritime activities.
While not the central point of competition between China and other powers in the Indian and Bay of Bengal oceans, analysts consider the Chittagong Port a “secondary strategic node,” meaning it cannot be ignored in the regional equation. Though it cannot accommodate very large ships, its location makes it the most important shipping point in northern South Asia. As a result, the port carries significant economic and geographic value in the competition among major powers. China’s Kyaukphyu port is effectively a strategic landmark. By contrast, its proximity makes Chittagong far more important and sensitive in the eyes of other regional powers, analysts say.
On this, writer and researcher Altaf Parvez told Bonik Barta, “Chittagong’s importance as a port is one thing, but its location and the geopolitics that have developed around it are even more significant. The port itself has limited capacity and is far from being able to match the scale of Singapore or Colombo. Yet its geographic position gives it major strategic value. Japan’s large investment in a deep-sea port should not be viewed solely in economic terms. When a country undertakes such a major infrastructure project abroad, it considers not just financial returns but also regional security, supply chains, and future alliance politics. It’s natural that both China and the United States would want Bangladesh aligned with their blocs. I believe there is also a geopolitical dimension to foreign involvement in Chittagong port, and it is significant that this is happening under an unelected government, shortly after a mass uprising.”
He added, “Bangladesh is a small country but strategically positioned. The reality is that the United States, China, and India will each pursue their own strategic plans here. The real question is what Bangladesh will do within this triangular or bilateral competition. Does the country have any independent political capacity? Rather than tilting toward one bloc, the question should be whether we can maintain balance, avoid full alignment with any single power, and engage all parties to maximize our advantage. This is the central challenge of future geopolitics.”
Many experts also argue that despite the geopolitical pressure, this situation presents a major opportunity for Bangladesh. With proper diplomatic negotiation, the country could become a regional maritime hub like Singapore. Yet since independence, Bangladesh has never developed a clear maritime policy. Without that foundation for negotiation, its strategic advantages have remained largely untapped. Weak policymaking and a deferential foreign policy are key reasons for this.
Maritime consultant and Universiti Malaysia Terengganu (UMT) faculty Captain Dr. Rezaul Karim Chowdhury told Bonik Barta, “We are a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and we also fall within the Maritime Silk Route. At the same time, we are within the geographic scope of the Blue Dot Network, which has been developed by the United States, Japan, and Australia. Viewed from one perspective, being part of these global mega-infrastructure frameworks presents a major opportunity. The question is whether we are actually able to derive any tangible benefits from it. I believe we have a gap in diplomatic awareness here.”
He further said, “Sixty to eighty percent of China’s, Japan’s, and South Korea’s energy and goods imports and exports pass through Bay of Bengal. This means they must travel via the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Because U.S. influence in the countries around the Malacca Strait is so strong, China sees this as a security risk. That is why they are seeking alternative routes, such as the proposed Kra Canal in Thailand, though it has not yet been realized. Another alternative is their development of the Kyaukphyu port and pipeline in Myanmar. But if this corridor becomes unstable for any reason, Bangladesh could emerge as another potential option.”
On Bangladesh’s diplomatic position, he said, “If the state fully aligns with one side, the other side will perceive it as a threat. But if we maintain balance, keep no single influence overtly visible, and maintain relations with all parties, this could become a major opportunity for us.”