Bangladesh emerged through a bloody Liberation War in 1971, driven by the aspiration to build an egalitarian and democratic society. People longed for an independent democratic state—one free from discrimination, political oppression, or restrictions on freedom of speech. As a state, Bangladesh is now 54 years old. Within this span, two major political turning points occurred in August, five decades apart—the first on August 15, 1975, and the second on August 5, 2024. In both cases, the shifts were centered around autocratic, one-party, and fascist regimes.
The four fundamental principles declared in the 1972 Constitution were democracy, socialism, secularism, and nationalism. However, even before the first year of independence had passed, deviations began. Suppression of dissent and opposition politics intensified. The democratic balance that was supposed to be embedded in the state structure collapsed. The inherent promises of the Liberation War started to fade. As a result, discontent began to build within the state. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman formed BAKSAL on January 24, 1975, dissolving all political parties. He imposed a one-party system and shut down press freedom. On August 15, 1975, he was assassinated along with most of his family. His regime came to an end. Khandakar Mostaq Ahmad took over, though that arrangement did not last long. Through the Sepoy-Jonota Biplob (Soldiers-People’s Revolution) on November 7, Ziaur Rahman (Bir Uttam) emerged as the national leader. He had declared independence in 1971 and also fought on the frontlines during the war.
Nearly five decades later, on August 5, 2024, history repeated itself—though in a different context. Following three consecutive controversial elections since 2008, the suppression of political opponents, rampant state-level corruption and money laundering, and severe restrictions on freedom of expression, a mass movement led by students and citizens transformed into a mass uprising. Sheikh Hasina’s fifteen-year rule came to an end, and an interim government was formed. In both instances, the change in national leadership brought shifts in the country’s administrative framework, diplomatic relations, as well as economic and internal dynamics.
Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family on August 15, 1975, Khandakar Mostaq Ahmad was sworn in as President. He had been the Minister of Commerce in Sheikh Mujib’s cabinet. On August 20, Mostaq declared martial law and took over as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). A presidential-style authoritarian structure replaced the parliamentary system. The post of Prime Minister was abolished, and a new cabinet was formed under military oversight, comprising 12 ministers and 11 state ministers. Of the 23 members, 22 had served in the former BAKSAL government.
Various rumors began circulating in India regarding the role of the United States soon after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s assassination. On August 19, Kolkata-based Anandabazar Patrika quoted Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi as saying that the assassination proved how active the CIA and China are in the subcontinent. At a protest organized by the All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation (AIPSO), CPI leader Bhupesh Gupta directly accused the CIA of involvement. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi expressed strong resentment at the accusation. According to the United States, such false and irresponsible allegations from influential circles in India were further muddying the situation.
Following the fall of Sheikh Mujib’s government, sudden changes were seen in the country’s markets. On August 28, 1975, the then-national daily Dainik Bangla reported that rice prices had fallen across the country and brought a sense of relief to the general public. As rice prices dropped, the prices of other essential commodities also began to decrease. Prices fell for food grains, clothing, baby food, and various other items. During this period, dishonest traders went into hiding. In 1975, the inflation rate under Sheikh Mujib’s leadership reached a record 67.17 percent. After his ouster, the following year saw a sharp drop in inflation, which turned negative at minus 8.36 percent.
After seizing power, the Khandakar Mostaq Ahmad-led government released a white paper on corruption covering the period from 1971 to 1975. It highlighted corruption among high-ranking government officials, lack of planning, and widespread socio-economic irregularities. The white paper claimed that despite spending nearly 50 percent of the allocated funds on development projects during Sheikh Mujib’s tenure, the intended outcomes were not achieved. Through this document, Mostaq’s government essentially documented the deterioration and mismanagement of the previous regime and promised to establish a “transparent and accountable” administration.
After assuming power on August 15, 1975, Khandakar Mostaq Ahmad made several speeches and issued official statements promising the restoration of democracy. He declared that freedom of expression and a governance system based on public participation would be established in the country. He also hinted at organizing a credible election. However, in reality, the dominance of the military over his administration, the suspension of political party activities, and the suppression of free speech raised questions about the credibility of those promises. Many viewed Mostaq’s declarations of bringing back democracy as an attempt to create political legitimacy, which ultimately never materialized. His rule lasted for less than three months. On November 6, 1975, he was forced to resign.
Within the first seven days of November, Bangladesh witnessed a coup and a counter-coup. On November 3, a coup was led by Khaled Mosharraf. Then, on November 7, he was killed during a counter-coup. At the time, rumors spread that Khaled Mosharraf’s coup was pro-India. Analysts have frequently cited that rumor as a reason for the failure of his coup. Between the two coups, on November 3, four national leaders—Tajuddin Ahmad, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, and Mohammad Qamaruzzaman—were killed inside Dhaka Central Jail.
August last year began with widespread fear and anxiety. In the two weeks prior, a wave of violence had erupted across the country during the quota reform movement led by general students. Clashes with police, members of the Chhatra League, Jubo League, and other wings of the ruling Awami League resulted in multiple deaths. In a bid to suppress the protests, the government shut down internet access, which severely impacted the overall economy. The movement grew stronger with each passing day, and on August 5, it escalated into a full-scale uprising involving students and the general public. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country. With her departure, key state institutions, already weakened under her decade and a half of autocratic rule, began to collapse. For the next three days, Bangladesh had no functioning government or administrative leadership. On August 8, an interim government was formed under the leadership of Dr. Muhammad Yunus, with the full backing of the military.
When Sheikh Hasina fled, the economy was already in deep crisis. In the month before the government’s fall, general inflation stood at 11.66 percent, while food inflation was at 14.10 percent. Syndicates had a firm grip on the market. However, immediately after the regime change, extortion and syndicate control began to weaken. Prices of essentials such as rice, lentils, and cooking oil started to fall. Around the same time, severe flooding hit the eastern region of the country. Vast areas of Chattogram, Cumilla, Khagrachhari, and Feni went under water. Within days of forming the new government, the newly appointed advisers faced their first major test—responding to the floods.
Following Sheikh Hasina’s fall, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations lauded Bangladesh’s democratic transition. However, India refrained from making any official comment, saying only that it was “closely monitoring the situation.” But Hasina’s sudden arrival in India seeking refuge placed New Delhi in a diplomatic dilemma. For years, India had been criticized for its silent support of Hasina’s regime, despite repeated allegations of political repression, electoral manipulation, and crackdowns on free speech under her rule. In this context, a boycott movement against Indian products emerged across Bangladesh, triggering widespread anti-India sentiment. The strain was not just political—economic and strategic ties between the two countries also came under pressure. Despite granting political asylum to Hasina, India extended its goodwill to the interim government early on. Soon after Dr. Muhammad Yunus and his cabinet were sworn in, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi sent a message of congratulations and declared New Delhi’s intent to continue working with Dhaka. Still, Hasina’s fall left behind an “uncomfortable reality” in Bangladesh-India relations.
In August 2024—shortly after Sheikh Hasina resigned and left the country—various rumors, conspiracy theories, and misleading reports began circulating in Indian media outlets and on social media. Some so-called television channels and online portals spread claims that a Western intelligence agency had played a direct role behind the political shift. Old videos of protests and clashes were presented as recent events. In most cases, these reports were exaggerated and distorted.
The report of the White Paper Committee on Corruption, formed by the interim government, stated that over the past 15 years, a system of “kleptocracy” had emerged in Bangladesh, evolving from a previously existing “crony capitalism.” According to the white paper, between 2009 and 2024, a total of $234 billion (approximately BDT 26 trillion) was illegally siphoned out of the country through 28 different methods of embezzlement and corruption involving state means. In addition, the Dr. Yunus-led government announced that a participatory and internationally recognized free election would be held by April 2026. With this announcement, the government expressed its commitment to restoring internal democracy.
Regarding this, economist and CPD distinguished fellow Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya told Bonik Barta, “The main goal of the 2024 mass uprising was to establish democracy. A kind of democracy that won’t allow fascism to return again. That’s why this student-led uprising is different from other uprisings. This time, the entire structure has come into question. The thinking behind this uprising—how it will reshape mainstream politics and how politics will embrace it—is what we are waiting to see. We believe the election will create an opportunity to see that.”
Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024, the interim administration pledged to rebuild the country’s economy. But so far, no significant progress has been made. Private investment remains stagnant, while unemployment, inequality, and poverty continue to deepen. Although there has been some improvement in inflation and the employment crisis, the overall situation remains far from encouraging. The law-and-order situation has also shown little progress, with rising incidents of mob justice in several areas. Widespread bribery and corruption continue to grip every level of the state machinery. The promise of change appears to be taking shape slowly. Like the previous government, the current administration is still heavily reliant on bureaucrats from the old regime, filled with politically recommended and contract-based appointments—further complicating the public administration.
It has now been one year since the student-led mass uprising. This has raised a vital question: which direction is post-uprising Bangladesh heading toward?
In comparison, Sri Lanka showed visible political and economic progress within just two years of its own mass uprising. On the other hand, Tunisia—the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011—has yet to find stability, even though more than a decade has passed. Tunisia’s interim government, formed after the uprising, faced criticism from the beginning—especially for including beneficiaries of the previous regime, failing to rehabilitate the injured and families of those killed, and being unable to restore peace on campuses. As tensions grew between secular and far-right political groups, it fueled hatred and conflict across society.
Some parallels are now emerging in Bangladesh’s post-uprising phase. One year later, many students have still not fully returned to academic life. There has been little progress in administrative reform, and in many areas, public expectations remain unmet. Several economic indicators remain under pressure, and the country is yet to make meaningful strides toward political unity or participatory reforms.
On the overall situation, former adviser to the caretaker government, Hossain Zillur Rahman, told Bonik Barta, “The interim government began with soaring popularity. But a clear, ruthless analysis shows that its major strategic weaknesses became evident within just one year. The most urgent need was reforming the institutional foundations or pillars of fascist power—like the bureaucracy. What surprised me most was that the interim government aligned its rhetoric with the aspirations of the mass uprising, promising many reforms. Yet, at the same time, they say they need their bureaucrats. The bureaucracy is an institution and it is true that governance cannot run without it. But bureaucracy and bureaucratic rule are two different things. Bureaucrats prioritize their own interests the most. They are not very concerned about grassroots results. The interim government has surprisingly echoed the mass uprising’s hopes on one hand, but chosen bureaucratic rule as the means to implement change. This is a completely contradictory action, and we can clearly see the consequences of this contradiction now.”
He also noted that the interim government has taken many initiatives and done good work regarding reforms. He added, “They formed various reform commissions. But even there, community involvement was minimal. Recommendations were mainly based on bureaucratic advice. They included political parties or institutions in the count more than the general public. They are not used to valuing ordinary people. In other words, what we are seeing is the reality of bureaucratic rule. The medical treatment and rehabilitation of those injured in July needed to be prioritized and resolved quickly. But the fastest action taken was the swift rehabilitation and empowerment of a bureaucratic group under the name of ‘the deprived.’ Even now, ongoing reform efforts have not given proper attention to education, health, labor rights, local government, or police reform. The government has spent a lot of time on discussions about reforms. But even in those discussions, areas that play a crucial role in people’s daily lives—justice, police, education, health—have received little attention. Because one of the distinct messages of the 2024 mass uprising was ‘talk alone won’t do; actions must prove it.’ And after a year, it is time to take stock of how ruthlessly they have acted to show results. We want the interim government to succeed. We want the aspirations of the mass uprising to be achieved and implemented.”