Post–uprising societies often confront stark political polarization, rising crime, reform backsliding, corruption, and widespread public disillusionment. When a governing system retreats from its promises of liberalization, the road to democratic transition narrows. Ideological polarization and the absence of inclusive governance trap politics in a cycle of instability and authoritarian relapse—Tunisia and Egypt being vivid examples. After the Arab Spring, expectations of democratic progress in both countries collided with a harsher reality. In Egypt, following the fall of Autocratic ruler Hosni Mubarak, intense conflicts erupted between the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and secular forces. When the Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi won the presidency in 2012, his Islamist agenda alienated secular parties, the military, and the judiciary. In 2013, after massive protests, the military staged a coup and removed Morsi. In Tunisia, after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s ouster, a fierce ideological confrontation over the constitution and governance broke out between the Islamist Ennahda and secular parties, pushing the country toward deadlock. Through mediation by the National Dialogue Quartet, an interim government was formed and a new constitution was adopted in 2014. Yet in the years that followed, repeated coalition-making and breakups between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda prevented any government from completing a full term. Against this backdrop of political division, President Kais Saied suspended the constitution in 2021 and centralized power in his own hands—effectively returning Tunisia to authoritarian rule.
According to political analysts, Bangladesh now stands at an uncertain threshold of transition—somewhere between the Tunisian and Egyptian trajectories. Much like Tunisia and Egypt in the immediate post-uprising period, Bangladesh is exhibiting sharp political polarization, deep mistrust, and institutional friction that weaken prospects for democratic consolidation. Analysts argue that divisions surrounding the implementation of the July National Charter have heightened the risk of political deadlock. Questions raised about the Charter’s implementation recommendations and the presentation of “notes of dissent” are not just political; they go to the heart of inclusivity in policymaking. Many fear this crisis could nudge the country toward prolonged instability.
On this issue, Major General (Retd.) Fazle Elahi Akbar, Chairman of the Foundation for Strategic and Development Studies (FSDS), told Bonik Barta, “If notes of dissent were not to be accepted, why hold a dialogue at all? At the time of signing the Charter, it was stated that there would be notes of dissent. Why, then, are they missing from the recommendations for implementing the July Charter? My question is whether the Consensus Commission is itself creating disunity. Matters on which there was no dispute could have been enacted by executive order, while issues involving notes of dissent could have been referred to the next parliament for deliberation. If this leads to a deadlock, it will open the door to intervention by other actors—everyone should keep that in mind.”
Regarding the commission’s recommendations on charter implementation, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) argues that, under the constitution, the interim government lacks the authority to issue implementation orders. At a press conference on October 30, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir said, “Holding a referendum before the national election is unnecessary, irrational, and ill-considered.” He alleged that the recommendations failed to reflect political parties’ views, differences of opinion, and notes of dissent, thereby rendering a year-long dialogue process meaningless, farcical, and deceptive to the nation. Jamaat-e-Islami, meanwhile, has demanded a referendum before the election. At another press conference held on the same day, Jamaat’s Nayeb-e-Ameer, Dr. Syed Abdullah Mohammad Taher, said, “In light of the Commission’s recommendations, we want an immediate government order. We want a referendum before the national election. Based on the referendum’s verdict, we want elections in February.”
In response to whether current tensions could push Bangladesh toward a Tunisia- or Egypt-style scenario, Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman told Bonik Barta, “Bangladesh will not head toward any other country’s path. We do not see such a risk. Why should Bangladesh go Tunisia’s way? Bangladesh will stay on Bangladesh’s course. We want elections. The interim government should hold the polls within its stipulated timeline.”
On the issue of the referendum, he added, “Holding a referendum or an election is not difficult. A referendum has no candidates or symbols. There is no need to print many types of ballots. Just ‘yes’ or ‘no’. It’s a simple process. Fix a date. Parties will take their positions to the people. It can be held within 15 to 25 days.”
Multiple international think-tank assessments have concluded that Tunisia’s political divisions ultimately weakened democracy and reinforced authoritarian rule. A report by the International Crisis Group observes that, after the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s main issues were failures of inclusive policymaking, entrenched ideological divides, and indecision. A decade of revolving governments fostered public fatigue with democracy. Essentially, deficits in governance opened the door for President Kais Saied to concentrate power.
In Egypt, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s ascent was a direct consequence of post-2011 turbulence. Despite the new political energy that followed Mubarak’s fall, the Muslim Brotherhood and secular parties failed to translate that momentum into an inclusive democracy. As the International Crisis Group has noted, Morsi’s Brotherhood sought to convert its mass support into political dominance, expanding executive control over the judiciary and administration via constitutional changes. When Morsi amassed extraordinary presidential powers and moved against opponents in the name of constitutional reform, the country’s politics fractured. Secular and liberal groups grew fearful. In June 2013, the Tamarod movement mobilized millions, demanding Morsi’s resignation. Rather than defending democratic norms, secular parties invited military intervention. Positioning himself as the guardian of state stability, then-army chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led the military to depose Morsi and suspend the constitution. In effect, the political parties’ immaturity and the lack of inclusive policy-making hollowed Egypt’s democracy from within, clearing the way for el-Sisi.
Asked whether political polarization could steer Bangladesh toward outcomes akin to Tunisia or Egypt, researcher and political analyst Altaf Parvez told Bonik Barta, “Ideological polarization is not new; it began immediately after the mass uprising. What we are seeing now is one subdivision after another within those existing divides. We have reached a red line. The divisions are becoming long-term. If they persist, the state will be indirectly weakened.”
He added that Bangladesh has drifted far from where it stood after the 2024 mass uprising. “The government cannot escape responsibility. Mismanagement has brought us here. I fear the divisions will not be resolved—even an election will not fix them. In fact, conflict may intensify in the one to two years after the election. If that happens, uncertainty will deepen. There is also a strong fear of various types of intervention.”
Badiul Alam Majumdar, a member of the National Consensus Commission, does not foresee a referendum-related impasse preventing elections or causing deadlock. Speaking to Bonik Barta, he said, “One of the interim government’s three priorities is reform. The decision to implement the July Charter will largely fulfill the people’s aspirations for reform. As a result, it will also smooth the path to holding elections on schedule. I therefore see no possibility that the Charter’s recommendations will prevent the election, because holding both the referendum and the election would address two of the government’s priorities. Whether the referendum takes place on the day of the election or beforehand depends on the Election Commission’s capacity and readiness. The government should therefore consult the commission when deciding the referendum date.”