Ahmad Kaikaus, the former principal secretary to the prime minister, was among the most influential bureaucrats under the Awami League government. While in government service, he acquired United States citizenship and amassed substantial assets there. Kaikaus exemplifies the role a section of powerful civil servants played in building what critics describe as the Awami League’s fascist regime.
Dr Kaikaus obtained US citizenship while pursuing a PhD in Dallas, remaining a serving member of the Bangladesh Civil Service. He returned to Bangladesh and resumed his administrative career after the Awami League returned to power in 2009. His career began on January 21, 1986, with his entry into the administration cadre. He held various field and secretariat roles including Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) and executive magistrate, later becoming chairman of the Bangladesh Energy and Power Research Council. He served as acting secretary of the Power Division in 2017, was appointed principal secretary to the prime minister in December 2019, reappointed in 2020, and retired in December 2022.
Alongside his foreign citizenship, he owns multiple properties in Texas and New York. Reliable sources indicate he is currently in Washington DC and working with a lobbying firm.
Dr Kaikaus is not an isolated case. Numerous senior officials from the previous government’s bureaucracy face allegations of acquiring foreign citizenship and assets. Allegations suggest a significant portion of irregularities and corruption in megaprojects was facilitated or distributed through such officers. A large share of expenditure on major infrastructure, power, and road and bridge projects was siphoned off through bribes and commissions, with much of the money reaching family networks abroad.
A substantial number of Bangladeshis who have amassed wealth overseas are government bureaucrats. Reports focus on house purchases in Canada, the US, the UK, the UAE, and Australia; business investments; bank accounts; or family members obtaining citizenship abroad. In many cases, officials’ wives hold foreign citizenship and live permanently overseas, while their children are educated there. The officials themselves often maintain long–term visas in their own passports.
Such allegations are most frequently directed at officers in revenue, financial sectors, regulatory bodies and law–enforcement roles.
After the student–led mass uprising in 2024, expectations were high that the government would adopt a clear policy as part of broader state restructuring and act against such officials. No such initiative, however, has emerged from the interim administration.
The issue of civil servants holding foreign citizenship or maintaining family and assets abroad is not unique to Bangladesh. Senior officials in other countries have exhibited similar patterns. In China, the trend first became visible in the late 1990s, when many government employees began relocating their spouses and children overseas while accumulating assets there. It accelerated sharply between 2003 and 2012, a period marked by rising corruption and bribery within the state apparatus. At the same time, immigration pathways to the United States, Canada and Australia eased for Chinese nationals, enabling officials to settle their families abroad while remaining close to power circles at home. Beijing then introduced the concept of the “naked official,” prompting administrative concern.
Officials whose spouses and children live overseas are typically classified as “naked officials”. Such arrangements are widely seen as facilitating corruption, providing functionaries a conduit to transfer funds abroad. In 2010, the Chinese government issued regulations explicitly prohibiting officials from moving their spouses and children overseas.
Affected officials were required to submit written disclosures detailing the names, locations and assets of spouses and children living abroad. A second phase began after 2013, coinciding with Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and the intensification of his anti–corruption campaign. Rules issued in 2014 barred officials with family abroad from positions involving military, diplomatic, national security or classified responsibilities. Penalties included demotion or reassignment to less sensitive posts; in many cases, officials were permitted to retain their positions only if they brought their families back into the country.
The final phase commenced around 2025, with Beijing tightening the policy further. Senior civil servants were required to return their families to China or relinquish their posts. Those who failed to repatriate were compelled to resign. The policy aimed to reduce officials’ reliance on overseas family ties and assets, curb corruption, and embed these measures within China’s national security framework.
Beijing treats officials’ families and assets abroad not as private matters but as matters of state governance, bringing them under administrative discipline through specific policies and appointment rules. In contrast, Bangladeshi bureaucrats holding foreign citizenship, with families and wealth overseas, remain largely unaddressed. At a November 2020 event, the foreign minister at the time said bureaucrats made up the largest group building houses abroad with laundered funds.
Analysts suggest the interim government could have adopted a framework modelled on China’s “naked officials” policy which would require high–ranking officials to disclose families living abroad, their assets and financial interests. It could also bar officials with overseas families or assets from sensitive or high–risk posts. Punitive measures — including demotion or dismissal — could apply where misconduct or conflicts of interest are found, potentially curbing corruption and capital flight within the bureaucracy.
Analysts note that when officials’ families reside permanently abroad, it creates multiple pressures and “conflict of interest” risks that can influence policy and administrative decisions. A policy similar to “naked officials” could therefore strengthen transparency, accountability and discipline within the administration.
Former secretary and ex–rector of the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC), AKM Abdul Awal Mazumder, said the interim government has taken no effective or visible steps to curb corruption among bureaucrats. He told Bonik Barta: “The expectation for change that arose in the country after August 5 is not being reflected in the fight against corruption. Many countries, particularly China, follow strict policies to control corruption among officials. There, government officials or their family members who acquire foreign citizenship are not appointed to high posts.”
“Many government officials first send their family members abroad and later pave the way for their own permanent residency overseas, while simultaneously holding important government positions at home. This dual position is not acceptable,” he added.
For years, analysts have warned that when individuals at the centre of state power secure their personal safety and future livelihoods abroad, it creates a risk of conflicts of interest in policymaking. In practice, no clear policy or mandatory disclosure regime exists to address this. While service rules prohibit dual citizenship, enforcement is weak. Though asset declarations are required, verification of overseas holdings or family residency remains minimal.
Following the student–led uprising of August 5, 2024, discussions on reforming the election system, police, administration and judiciary gained traction. Yet no concrete measures were taken to curb corruption or the capital flight risks linked to bureaucrats’ overseas assets and families. While reforms emphasised institutional restructuring, they produced no policy on the nexus between state power and the private interests and security of those running these institutions.
Political analysts argue the post–uprising reform process focused on institutions. But bureaucracy itself is a powerful class where policy–making and implementation authority is concentrated. Reform remains partial, analysts say, without examining officials’ lifestyles, wealth sources or future security. Overseas assets and families are not merely moral or financial concerns but a question of personal interests intersecting with state power. Without clarifying this relationship, administrative reform will remain largely theoretical, with limited practical impact.
On the issue, Dr Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), told Bonik Barta: “A major opportunity to combat corruption arose after August 5, 2024. That opportunity has not been used to take any effective and visible action. Although corruption prevention and public administration reform are closely linked, progress hasn’t been seen in practice. The Public Administration Reform Commission’s comprehensive proposals included corruption prevention as a key component. Yet while some limited aspects were prioritised, fundamental and structural reforms were not implemented. Even proposals that could have been enacted via ordinance or government decision saw no action.”
He added that, in reality, only limited steps were taken in select and convenient areas. In some cases, legal measures appeared aimed at suppressing internal dissent or rivalries within the administration, but this does not constitute genuine reform. “Public administration reform doesn’t only mean raising salaries or taking isolated administrative decisions. Visible action was needed on fundamental issues: transparency, accountability, asset disclosure, and fairness in appointments and promotions,” he said.
Inquiries show that foreign citizenship was once strictly barred for appointments to senior government posts. Government employees were previously even prohibited from marrying foreign nationals. During the 2007–08 caretaker government, an officer from the 1982 foreign service cadre sought permission to marry a Belgian expatriate. The government considered the case and relaxed the rule, and concessions in these areas were gradually extended thereafter.
At the start of 2025, the Anti–Corruption Commission (ACC) requested information from various agencies on dual citizenship or foreign passport holders among government employees and state–paid personnel. The commission warned that some officials were secretly acquiring dual citizenship and foreign passports to evade corruption investigations and legal accountability. Certain officials had obtained foreign passports in violation of Section 40 of the Government Service Act 2018. The ACC noted that such actions facilitate the concealment of illegally acquired assets abroad and the avoidance of scrutiny.
The commission also observed that some officers were laundering money through dual citizenship, harming both the national economy and the integrity of public services. During the previous government’s tenure, many senior military officers also held dual citizenship; some were later forced to renounce it while others were dismissed from service.
The current interim government established a white paper committee to investigate irregularities and corruption in the economy during the Sheikh Hasina–led Awami League government’s fifteen–year rule. The committee’s report alleges that roughly BDT 7 trillion was spent on government projects for roads, bridges, power facilities, infrastructure, hospitals and educational institutions. From this, an estimated BDT 1.61 trillion to BDT 2.8 trillion was paid in bribes, with BDT 770 billion to BDT 980 billion going directly to bureaucrats. Most of these kickbacks were transferred to officials’ family members living abroad.
Public administration experts say acquiring foreign citizenship is not merely a matter of holding a passport; it entails an oath of allegiance to another country. They say individuals with dual citizenship should not occupy roles linked to state security, law and order, policy–making or constitutional authority. This includes ministers, MPs, policy–making positions within the secretariat and senior administrative posts in defence, police, intelligence agencies and district administration. Decisions in these roles shape the nation’s future, making undivided loyalty essential.
On the issue, former Cabinet Secretary M Musharraf Hossain Bhuiyan told Bonik Barta: “The matter of dual citizenship is still not clearly defined in the context of Bangladesh. For government employees, the law states they must be citizens of Bangladesh. However, for contractual or project–based appointments, dual citizenship hasn’t been considered a barrier. Consequently, an individual can acquire foreign citizenship and still work in an important post on a contractual basis, which has created significant ambiguity.”
“An individual with dual citizenship cannot be an MP or minister, as those positions require sole Bangladeshi citizenship,” he added. “Yet if the same person can serve as a secretary or in a senior administrative post on contractual basis, it creates a logical contradiction. Essentially, someone who cannot be trusted as a minister is being trusted at the top tier of the administration — this is a clear inconsistency.”
He added, “Following August 5, as part of the expected change, the government could have clearly defined which posts require only Bangladeshi citizens and where dual citizenship is acceptable. But thus far, the government hasn’t taken any such clear policy position.”