To ease the severe congestion and environmental pressure in Cox’s Bazar, the government relocated a portion of the Rohingya population to Bhasan Char. The aim was to provide better housing, security, and basic services. But recent studies and field reports have revealed a different picture. Rising operating costs, food insecurity, health risks, lack of employment opportunities, and deteriorating mental health have made life on Bhasan Char costlier and more complicated than in Cox’s Bazar. Since the per capita maintenance cost on Bhasan Char is nearly three times higher than in Cox’s Bazar, serious questions have been raised regarding financial sustainability. Discussions have emerged on whether relocating Rohingyas to Bhasan Char was the right decision or whether it is turning into a costly but ineffective humanitarian effort.
According to government data, during the Awami League government, the Bhasan Char Ashrayan Project was implemented with BDT 30.95 billion from state funds. On the 13,000-acre island, infrastructure for 120 cluster villages was built to accommodate 100,000 Rohingyas.
The World Bank study titled “Beyond Camps and Communities: The Economics of Refugee Relocation in Bangladesh” reported that the annual operating cost per Rohingya on Bhasan Char has reached $1,350 to $1,810, nearly three times the $430 to $580 cost in Cox’s Bazar. The main reasons are the island’s remote location and higher maintenance expenses. For example, food assistance and nutrition programming per person costs an average of $470 to $565 a year on Bhasan Char, while in Cox’s Bazar it is only $150 to $180. Shelter and protection expenses are similarly much higher.
The World Bank report noted that despite overcrowding, unsafe infrastructure, and limited services in Cox’s Bazar, refugees at least remained connected to the land, allowing them to access the local economy and social networks. In contrast, since 2020, a portion of the refugees have been gradually moved to Bhasan Char, 60 kilometers away, a place geographically isolated and disconnected from markets, education, health systems, and social communities.
According to the report, families relocated to Bhasan Char are in much worse condition compared to those remaining in Cox’s Bazar. Their average food consumption quality has fallen by 44 percent. Dietary diversity has declined by 37 percent. Daily food intake frequency has dropped by nearly 47 percent. Both mental and physical health conditions have worsened. The rate of moderate to severe depression has risen by 6.2 percent, while the rate of physical illnesses is 17 percent higher.
In terms of employment, Rohingyas living on Bhasan Char are also lagging behind. Their average monthly wages are nearly 45 percent lower than those in Cox’s Bazar. There is a significant gap in access to assistance as well. The likelihood of receiving food aid on Bhasan Char is 28 percentage points lower, while access to essential supplies has decreased by 38 points.
The World Bank says that Bhasan Char’s geographic and economic isolation is the main reason behind these conditions. Located 60 kilometers from the mainland, with no local population, the island lacks markets, labor opportunities, and supply chains. Its complete dependence on external logistics and aid has created major constraints in service delivery, employment creation, and product supply. On top of that, the government’s one-time investment in Bhasan Char’s infrastructure was unprecedented. Housing, roads, embankments, electricity, and other facilities cost nearly $10,000 per person. According to the report, due to the small population, the usual benefit of reduced per capita costs through larger-scale spending does not apply here. In other words, there is no way to share or reduce the cost, resulting in much higher expenses per person.
The study’s findings have revived questions about how effective the Bhasan Char relocation model is as a sustainable solution. On multiple indicators—nutrition, health, employment, and aid access—relocated refugees have not improved; instead, they have clearly worsened. The highly vulnerable refugee population now faces not only these negative outcomes but also the burden of Bhasan Char’s costly infrastructure, which is three times more expensive per capita than Cox’s Bazar. Given the limited humanitarian resources, such a high-cost initiative is financially unsustainable. Geographic isolation and economic backwardness have further intensified the structural constraints of Bhasan Char. The World Bank report highlights that overall evidence indicates the remote island relocation model is both a humanitarian and economic failure. It says the continuation of Bhasan Char needs to be reconsidered, as the model is neither financially nor humanitarianly sustainable and only creates an isolated humanitarian enclave with no long-term solution or sustainable prospects.
At one stage of the Rohingya relocation to Bhasan Char, several United Nations agencies and more than 50 international and local NGOs became involved in the process, although the Bangladesh government and the Navy initially carried out the relocation on their own.
The Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) was established in 1992 to provide humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya population displaced from Myanmar’s Rakhine State to Cox’s Bazar at different times. When asked about the effectiveness of the relocation decision, an official from the RRRC, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the realities at the time the decision was made and the realities now are not the same. He added that it would not be appropriate to comment on the contents of the World Bank report without further analysis.
However, many experts say the decision was not good when considering costs. They describe it as a political decision. At the time it was made, there was a sense of “we know best” in every sector, from foreign policy to others. It was largely an attempt to demonstrate capacity to the United Nations. The government portrayed the idea that “we are doing it alone,” but ultimately, it could not sustain this. Initially, the plan was to relocate 100,000 people, which the then government could not achieve due to funding shortages. The social and psychological costs were also not considered. After the initial relocations, many tried to flee from Bhasan Char. Eventually, mismanagement emerged.
On this issue, refugee expert Asif Munier told Bonik Barta, “I do not think the decision to relocate to Bhasan Char was correct. The decision was made only after looking at physical feasibility. It came from a mindset of providing a quick solution. The major influx in 2017 should have been analyzed deeply to understand that there would be no easy solution. There was a sense of showmanship or perhaps a desire to influence public opinion in that decision. Reducing the pressure on Cox’s Bazar was part of it, but when making the decision, all stakeholders, including the United Nations and other experts, needed to be involved.”
However, former Professor of International Relations (IR) at the University of Dhaka (DU), Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, believes Bangladesh had no alternative but to relocate the Rohingyas due to national security reasons. Speaking to Bonik Barta, he said, “The relocation was necessary for our security. At that time, about 40,000 Rohingyas started living scattered along the coast and near the border. Since they were outside the camps, it became difficult to control drug trafficking, including yaba, in those areas. In addition, there were concerns about other security risks. In the end, as many relocations as initially planned were not needed. The law enforcement agencies were able to improve law and order in the entire area by establishing control. As a result of the relocation, drug smuggling in that region has decreased significantly.”